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NOTES
IN Rz Lit DMEmCrOR
Some fifty years ago, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminologist,
published his findings concerning the changes in blood pressure and
pulse rate when a person was questioned concerning his activities.'
This was the feeble beginning of the utilization of scientific principles
in the exposing of deceptidn. Through the development of the
technique by such men as Marston, Larson, and Keeler, evolved the
polygraph, or what is commonly called the lie-detector.2 The test
is based on the theory that the respiration, and the systolic and dia-
stolic blood pressure, vary from their "norm" when one is lying. In
other words, truthfulness comes with no effort, but conscious effort
is needed to tell a lie.3
The development of the scientific test for deception presents two
main problems to the courts: 1. Should results of the tests them-
selves be admitted into evidence through an expert? 2. Should other
evidence, such as confessions, obtained by the use of the lie detector
be admitted?
Admission of the Tests into Evidence. - The lie detector has appeared
in our court decisions with increasing frequency since 1923, when
Frye v. United States4 was decided by the Court of Appeals in the
District of Columbia. The number of times the question has arisen
in the lower courts is unknown, but it can be assumed, from the
wide acceptance of the lie detector by the police and private investi-
gating bodies, that they are numerous.5
In the Frye case the federal court held that the systolic blood pres-
sure deception test, developed by Marston, was inadmissible. The
grounds of the decision were that the scientific principle, upon which
1. Lombroso, C., L'HoMM- CRIMI!NEr, (2d French ed. 1895).
2. Though there are numerous lie detectors, the Keeler polygraph has re-
ceived the widest acceptance by the police and other criminal investigating bodies.
3. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (1923). For a description of the
Keeler polygraph and the mode of its use see WIGAIoM, PRINCIPLItS OF JUDICIAT,
PROOF §246 (2d ed. 1931) ; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §999 (3rd ed. 1940).
4. Frye v. United States, supra.
5. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947). For some unreported
cases arising in the State of Wisconsin se the Wis. L. R. 430 (1943). For a
case in New York City see N. Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1943, p. 25, col. 7. In November
1948, Judge J. W. Pless admitted expert testimony of the results of the lie de-
tector in the case of State v. Howell, Cleveland Superior Court, N. C. This
case was never appealed.
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the test was based, had not been "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs".
Ten years later, the Wisconsin court passed upon the question in
State v. Bohner.6 It decided that in the ten years that had elapsed
since the Frye decision, the "instrument... had not progressed from
the experimental to the demonstrable stage". The court did, how-
ever, express its opinion that the test might be admitted at some
future date.
"While it [the lie detector] may have some utility at present,
and may ultimately be of great value in the administration of
justice, it must not be over looked that a too hasty acceptance
of it during this stage of its development may bring complica-
tions and abuses that will overbalance whatever utility it may
be assumed to have.
' 7
In contrast to this caution, the test received an enthusiastic recep-
tion by the Queen's County Court in New York state, five years
later, in People v. Kenny.8 There the defendant offered Rev. Sum-
mers as an expert to give the results of the test. Rev. Summers testi-
fied that his methods were 100 per cent efficient and accurate. Feeling
that the pathometer was a more scientific approach to the ascertain-
ment of the truth, the court accepted his testimony.
"Both upon legal principle and sound reasoning it would seem
that the courts, if willing to accept and receive handwriting testi-
mony, psychiatric testimony and other expert opinion, would
also admit in evidence testimony of the pathometer and the re-
sults disclosed thereby, when a proper foundation is laid." 9
The Kenny case was never appealed, but a few months later
the New York Appellate Court handed down a decision in People v.
Forte,'0 which was relative to the same question. The court upheld
the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of Rev. Summers
under a similar situation as that which arose in the Kenny case.
The court, however, did not rule directly on the scientific approval
of the test. It specifically stated, "... we cannot take judicial
6. 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
7. Ibid. at p. 317.
8. 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (1938).
9. Ibid. at p. 351. For a discussion of this case see The Lie Detector and the
Courts, 16 N. Y. U. Q. REv. 202 (1939), where the writer concluded that the
decision is "historically untenable, factually incorrect, and legally reversable".
For other comments see 29 J. CRztM. LAW 287; 15 NOTRx DAMZ LAW. 159
(1939) ; 86 U. PA. L. Rav. 903 (1935) ; 119 A. L. R. 1200.
10. 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938).
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notice that the instrument is or is not effective for determining the
truth". The court based its opinion on the grounds that there was no
evidence in the record tending to show a general scientific recognition
of the test. Many writers feel that People v. Forte did not overrule
the Kenny case, though the court certainly had an opportunity to do
so had it wished."
In People v. Becker12 the Michigan court was faced with a similar
problem as that decided in the Forte case. Here, too, the trial court
refused to consider the results of the polygraph, and here, too, no
proper foundation had been laid. The court felt that ". . . under the
circumstances of this case," the results should not have been admit-
ted.13
The Wisconsin court had the opportunity to pass upon the ad-
missibility of the lie detector again in LeFevre v. State,14 a 1943 de-
cision. Following precedent, particularly its own of the Bohner case,
the court refused to admit the results of the test. The conviction was
reversed on other grounds, but it is evident that the court itself, put
some weight on the results of the test.15
The district attorney had made a stipulation with the defendant
that either party could use the results of the tests at the trial. He
was apparently dissatisfied with the results of the first test and re-
quested the defendant to submit to another. At the trial, when de-
fendant attempted to introduce the results into the evidence, there
was an objection by the State on the ground that the test had not
gained general scientific recognition. This objection was sustained.
It appears from the report of the case that the district attorney ad-
mitted on rebuttle that the tests were favorable to the defendant.
The Supreme Court, while discussing the evidence, said in part, "....
while the findings of these experts were properly excluded from the
jury, the district attorney's testimony came in without objection and
we regard it as very significant".
Recently the Missouri court had a peculiar situation placed before
it. The defendant, in State v. Cole,' 6 requested that he and all the
11. See the dissenting opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N. W. 2d
593 (1949). The New York Judicial council has recently stated, ". . . in
'the light of tle decision in the Forte case, it cannot be said that the Kenty
case has been overruled. The legal status of the lie detector in New York,
therefore, remains uncertain". FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REMRT, JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF THE STATE OF N zv YORK, p. 266 (1948).
12. 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942).
13. It is to be noted that here the test was made on the Keeler polygraph,
while in the Forte case, a pathometer was used.
14. 242 Wis. 416, 8 N. W. 2d 288 (1943).
15. For an interesting comment on this decision see Wis. L. REv. 430 (1943).
16. 354 Mo. 181, 188 S. W. 2d 43 (1945).
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state's witnesses submit to the lie detector test in view of the jury.
The court decided that the refusal of the defendant's request was
proper. It was stated that the court room was no place for dramatics,
and that such would be the effect if defendant's motion had been
accepted. It was also decided that the trial court was not in error for
refusing to let the defendant take the test, first, because the test
should not be made before the jury, and second, because the defend-
ant did not offer proof that the method to be used had sufficient scien-
tific support.
The request of the defendant is unusual, for all of the "experts"
agree that the test must be taken in quiet surroundings, where there
will be no distractions, for it to be effective.
In 1947, the Kansas court reversed a conviction, in State v. Lowry,
17
where the results of the lie detector were introduced by the State.
The test had been given to both the defendant and the prosecuting
witness upon the suggestion of the court after the first trial, and
tended to show that the accused was guilty. The court founded its
decision on the grounds that no appellate court had recognized the
results of such test as competent, and further, that in no trial court,
where the results had been admitted, was the test adverse to the
defendant. The court was careful to point out that it was not con-
sidering a case where there had been a prior stipulation as to the use
of the test, but one in which the test was introduced without such
stipulation and over the defendant's objection. It can therefore be
assumed that this court, in contrast to the stand taken by the Wis-
consin court in the LeFeJre case, would look with approval upon the
admission of the results by stipulation by the parties.
The latest decision relative to the lie detector was in the case of
Boseche v. State.'8 Here the defendant offered the polygraph oper-
ator for the Nebraska Safety Patrol as an expert witness to show
that the lie detector tests made upon him recorded a favorable re-
action indicating that he was not guilty. Objection made to the
competency of such evidence was sustained. On appeal it was held
by a divided court that no error had been committed, as the polygraph
"... has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demon-
strable stage, . . . and that it has not yet received general scientific
acceptance".
Justice Chappell, joined by two others, while concurring in the
results, dissented from the majority's statement concerning the lie
detector.
17. 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947).
18. 151 Neb. 368, 37 N. W. 2d 593 (1949).
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"I am convinced that if such foundation were laid, as was done
in People v. Kenny, then the testimony of the operator and the
results obtained by the tests would be admissible in criminal
cases, . . . wherein the defendant had voluntarily submitted to
the tests." 19
In his well written opinion, Justice Chappell reviewed all of the
earlier decisions on the subject. He noted that People v. Becker2 O
and People v. Forte21 did not rule on the question of "general scien-
tific recognition", but only that no proper foundation had been laid
for admission of the results. In declaring that the time had arrived
for the courts to recognize this scientific test he stated:
"That complicated and difficult questions may arise therefrom
in the trial of cases should be no reason for the exclusion of
such evidence. Modem court procedure must embrace recog-
nized modem conditions of mechanics, psychology, sociology,
medicine ...The failure to do so will only serve to question
the ability of courts to efficiently administer justice."22
When the courts first considered the admissibility of the lie de-
tector twenty-seven years ago it was stated:
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."23
Though it cannot be said that the lie detector has received unani-
mQus support among the scientists,24 it has been accepted by the
criminal investigating bodies. Is this not the "particular field" in
which it belongs? The acceptance of finger-print evidence by the
courts was actuated partly because of its use by the police in England
19. Ibid. at p. 600.
20. 300 Mich. 562,2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942).
21. 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938).
22. Eee note 19, supra.
23. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1012 (1923).
24. The American Psychiatric Association expressed its opinion of the lie de-
tector in a resolution adopted at its 1944 convention. They felt that the "feeling
of guilt" is too complex to be tested by ore machine. 16 Sci. Dic. 90 (Sep.
1944) ; also see letter by the author of the resolution in N. Y. Timis, ag. 28, 1948,
p. 14, col. 15.
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and America.2 5  Then should the courts not also give weight to
the acceptance of the lie detector by the persons who actually use it
for criminal investigations ?26
It is true that the lie detector is not 100 per cent accurate,2'7 nor
is the theory behind it universally accepted. Yet, the courts accepted
expert opinion on handwriting and psychiatry, even though the de-
duction of these experts are not at all uniform.2 8 That two experts
testify and come to different results does not in itself make the testi-
mony incompetent. 29 Nor would the fact that an expert can come
to no conclusion in a particular set of circumstances, make such
testimony, under different circumstances, incompetent. It follows
that no objection should be made to lie detector results because a
small number of individuals fail to give an interpretable test.
The hesitancy of the courts to accept the lie detector at its face
value can partly be attributed to their belief that an innocent person
might be convicted. This danger, however, is minimized when the
operation of the test is understood. The burden of shoving "the lie"
is thrown upon the operator who must read the graph produced by
the machine. The operator is subject to cross-examination. His
readiness to accept an indefinite result could therefore be shown. It
is also well to remember that the margin of error is in favor of the
guilty rather than the innocent. In other words, the likelihood of a
guilty person not recording deception is greater than the innocent
showing it. It is doubted if the statistical data as to the accuracy of
the lie detector can ever be more comprehensive than- it is today.
Fear of detection, and the results thereof, is an important factor in
the test; and this condition is not present in the laboratory. The
only accurate method of obtaining statistics therefore, is from the
confessions obtained or from a later conviction. And it might be
questioned if a conviction is absolute proof of guilt.
All this is not to say that the courts should accept the lie detector
haphazardly. Caution should certainly prevail. Yet if these tests
aid the courts and juries in ascertaining the truth more than 70 per
cent of the time, should they not be admitted, as other expert testi-
25. People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077, 1081 (1911) ; People v.
Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 109 N. E. 618, 623 (1915).
26. For an interesting report by the polygraph operator of the Wichita Police
Department in which it was concluded that the test was 99.9 per cent effective,
see Jaycox, Lies-Truth, 161 Sci. Ami. 8 (31. 1939).
27. Rev. Summers claimed that his tests are 100 per cent accurate, though this
figure has been questioned by other authorities. The most conservative figure
seems to be around 10 per cent error.
28. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (1938).
29. Gordon v. Bartell, 182 Wash. 268, 46 P. 2d 1063 (1935) ; Green v. Union
Pac. States, 182 Wash. 268, 46 P. 2d 1063 (1935).
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mony for what they are worth? And certainly, as some courts have
indicated, they should be admitted upon prior stipulation of the par-
ties. It is to be remembered that the lie detector results will not dis-
place the jury. The results of the test and the opinion of the operator
will be weighed as any other "expert" evidence. In the final analysis,
the guilt or innocence of the accused will still be in the hands of the
jury.
Many interesting questions, such as the question of self-incrimina-
tion, will arise once the lie detector results are admitted into evidence.
It is not, however, in the scope of this note to discuss these problems.
The trend of the decisions is favorable to the acceptance of the
lie detector test into evidence. The culmination of this trend is aptly
expressed in the minority decision of the Boeche case. Though
various courts have intimated they would accept the test, here for the
first time, three eminent jurists explicitly sanctioned it. It is sub-
mitted that the dissent in the Boeche case is correct. The time has
come when the'courts must recognize that the lie detector has "crossed
the line between the experimental and demonstrable stage". Mr.
justice Steinbrink, in Beuschel v. Manowitz,3 0 aptly stated the de-
sired attitude of the courts when he said:
"Law and jurisprudence, which are sometimes more than dry
tomes of the past, can be understood by considering fundamental
principles not only of government and economics, but also at
times by giving consideration in particular cases to sociology,
medicine or other sciences . . . new concepts must beat down
the crystallized resistance of the legally trained mind that al-
ways seeks precedent before the new is accepted into the law.
Frequently we must look ahead and not backwards."
Confessions Obtained through the Use of the Lie Detector. - Only
three cases, two of which arose in Pennsylvania, 3 1 have ruled directly
on this question. The confessions, in both of these cases, were ad-
mitted on the theory that they had been obtained through voluntary
means.
In State v. DeHart,32 the defendant intimated that he was preju-
diced in that the sequence of events was such as to leave the impres-
sion with the jury that the lie detector test had demonstrated his
guilt, and that this circumstance actuated his confession. The court
30. 151 Misc. 899, 271 N. Y. S. 277, 278 (1934), where the court was con-
sidering the admissibility of expert testimony concerning blood grouping.
31. Commonwealth v. Hipple, 33 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d 353 (1939), and Common-
wealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. 2d 389 (1941).
32. 242 Wis. 562,8 N. W. 2d 360 (1943).
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did not feel that the defendant had been prejudiced, saying: "The
thing that was prejudicial . . . was the confession, which is many
times more conclusive than any implication that could be drawn from
... the lie detector test".
Other jurisdictions have indicated by dicta that they would ac-
cept a confession actuated by the lie detector test.88 These decisions
are in line with the generally accepted view that any confession is ad-
missible if it is given voluntarily.3 4 Since more than half of those
who register deception confess their guilt,3 5 this reception by the
court is indeed gratifying. Even those who do not think the lie de-
tector result is ready for admission into evidence realize its great
value in obtaining admissions and confessions.8 6 The end result,
therefore, is that the polygraph will continue to be utilized in this
manner by the criminal investigating bodies toward the more suc-
cessful administration of justice.
A. ARTHUR ROSENBLUM.
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS IN INCOME TAXATION
The problem of the so-called "family partnerships" was of little
importance in the enforcement of the Revenue Laws until the advent
of the high individual income tax rates during the past War Emer-
gency. However, during this emergency, it became quite fashionable
to attempt to alleviate a portion of the individual's tax burden by con-
stituting a member of that individual's family as a partner in his enter-
prise. This took the form, generally, of a donation of a portion of
the business to the member of the family with express understanding
that such capital was to be reinvested in the business. Such a device
for tax avoidance was, needless to say, greeted with a great deal of
suspicion by revenue authorities.
33. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147, 151 (1947). Also see the
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK,
p. 267 (1948), wherein it is stated, "although no reported New York decision has
been found in which this question arose, it does not appear that there should
be any objection to the admission of such evidence".
34. State v. Goodwin, 127 S. C. 107, 120 S. E. 496 (1923) ; State v. Rush, 108
W. Va. 254, 150 S. E. 740 (1929).
35. According to the figures of the Chicago Police Detection Laboratory, 75
per cent of those registering deception on the machine confessed. 216 SAT. Ev.
Post, 9, (Ap. 1944). The Wichita Police Department found that 55.1 per cent
of those decepted confessed. 74.7 per cent of those who did not confess, were
later convicted. These figures were based on 4,000 tests made by the department
for the years 1936, 1937, and 1938. Jaycox, Lies-Truth, 161 Sc. AmEL 8, (I1.
1939).
36. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF
NEw YORK, p. 267 (1948).
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It is axiomatic in our income tax structure that "income is taxed
to the person who earns it".1 As an illustration, consider the situa-
tion where a father, owner of a bond, retains the bond but assigns
the coupons to his son shortly before they mature. The income from
these coupons would be taxed to the father.2 Helvering v. Horst
rationalizes this'result,8
"Underlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that
income is 'realized' by the assignor because he, who owns or
controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition
of that which he could have received himself and diverts the
payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the
satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the
fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction
of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to pro-
cure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to
collect it as the means of procuring them".
The realities of the situation and not the peculiarities of local part-
nership law control in these instances.4
The rapid rise of the number of "family partnership" cases, in
which each case possessed its own peculiar facts, presented a per-
plexing problem to the Courts. The Tax Court, for instance, was
apparently hopelessly split, as was illustrated in one case5 in which
there were two concurring opinions and three dissents. One is re-
minded of Cervante's Don Quixote "and he immediately set off in all
directions".
It was inevitable that this situation should reach the Supreme
Court. This occurred in 1946, when two family partnership situa-
tions came before the Court.6 The Tower case is the only one to be
discussed here.
In the Tower case, the factual situation was that a husband gave
his wife a substantial interest in a closely held corporation. The cor-
poration was dissolved three days later and was succeeded by a part-
nership in which the rights of the wife were limited. The wife had
no control over the management of the business nor did she perform
1. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112
(1940).
2. Helvering v. Horst, supra.
3. Ibid at p. 116.
4. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1936).
5. Thoirez, 5 T. C. 60 (1945).
6. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946); Commissioner v. Lusthaus,
327 U. S. 292 (1946).
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any services for the business. Her withdrawals from the partner-
ship were used for such expenditures as were usually made by a hus-
band for his wife. The Tax Court refused to recognize this partner-
ship.7 The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court.8 The Tax Court's
opinion stated in part,9
"Here, the transfer of the corporate stock. . . was more fanciful
than actual, since there was no purpose to transfer the stock to
her apart from the agreed plan that the gift would determine
her interest in the partnership. The gift, however, was not an
absolute and unconditional one . . . it follows that she made no
capital contribution to the partnership, and, since she admittedly
rendered no services, it must be held that she was not a bona
fide partner."
The Supreme Court's opinion affirmed the Tax Court's finding of
fact in these words :10
"Here the Tax Court, acting pursuant to its authority in connec-
tion with the enforcement of federal laws, has found from the
testimony before it that respondent and his wife did not intend
to carry on business as a partnership. This finding of fact, since
supported by evidence is final."
In discussing the exception of the husband to the Tax Court's finding
that the gift of the capital was incomplete, the court, after stating,
"We do not find it necessary to decide this issue," continued .... Of
course, the question of legal ownership of capital purportedly contri-
buted by a wife will frequently throw light on the broader question
of whether an alleged partnership is real or pretended. But here,
the Tax Court's findings were supported by a sufficient number of
other factors in the transaction, so we need not decide whether its
holding as to the completeness of the gift was correct".
"There can be no question that a wife and-husband may, under
certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for other pur-
poses. If she either invests capital originating with her or sub-
stantially contributes to the control and management of the busi-
ness, or otherwise performs vital services, or does all of these
things she may be a partner . . . the Tax Court may properly
take these circumstances into consideration in determining wheth-
7. 3 T. C. 396 (1945).
8. 148 F. 2d 388 (1945).
9. 3 T. C. 396, p. 404 (1944).
10. 327 U. S. 280, p. 287 (1945).
10
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er the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal reven-
ue laws."
Subsequent to the promulgation of the Tower and Lusthaus de-
cisions, the Tax Court 11 and the Bureau' 2 adopted the concepts of
rendition of "vital services" and contribution of "substantial capital"
as absolute criteria for determining the "reality" of a partnership
within the family circle. If either of these criteria was not present
the partnership was ipso facto invalid for federal tax purposes. 13
The method of application of these criteria was possibly one of
the reasons for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in another
"family partnership" situation, the now celebrated Culbertson case.
14
The Court criticized the Tax Court's use of the "test" of "vital ser-
vices" or "original capital" as an "error in emphasis" as ignoring
"what we said is the ultimate question for decision", namely "whether
the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue
laws".
The court in a subsequent paragraph continued,
"The question is not whether the services or capital contributed
by a partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective
standard supposedly established by the Tower case, but whether,
considering all the facts - the agreement, the conduct of the
parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testi-
mony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties,
their respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual con-
trol of income and the purposes for which it is used, and other
facts throwing light upon their true intent- the parties in good
faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join to-
gether in the present conduct of the enterprise."
The Court, obviously perplexed at the Tax Court's inability to
follow the trail of "intent to join together for the purpose of carry-
ing on a business and sharing in the profits or losses or both . . .
to be determined from the testimony as a whole" as blazed in the
Tower case observed,
"There is nothing new or particularly difficult about such a test.
Triers of fact are constantly called upon to determine the in-
11. Ibid at p. 290.
12. I. T. 3845, C. B. 1947-1, p. 66.
13. 6 MRTE s, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXAriON 136.
14. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 69 S. Ct. 1210 (1949).
11
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tent with which a person acted' 5 . . .Whether parties really in-
tended to carry on business as partners is not, we think, any
more difficult of determination or the manifestations of such
intent any less perceptible than is ordinarily true of inquiries
into the subjective."
In the recent cases before it the Tax Court has, in general, given
polite recognition to the Culbertson case and continued its quest for
the illusive objective concepts of "vital services and original capital"
coupled often with a new discovery in the Culbertson case of "the
actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used".
Among the first decisions of the Tax Court following Culbertson
was the Harmon case. 16 In this decision the court considered that the
wife performed no substantial services nor contributed any capital
originating with herself. A son, also a member of the partnership,
was found to be a valid partner, the court finding the requisite intent
to join together in "the present conduct of the enterprise". This de-
cision was closely followed in point of time, by the Depue case, 17 in
which the Tax Court found the requisite intent in the wife's active
participation during the formative years of the partnership as consti-
tuting a contribution to the business in 1944 equivalent to a tangible
contribution of money and material. Judge Black dissented in this
case upon the general grounds that this decision "does violence" to
the Culbertson case.
The Tax Court found in two other decisions' 8 that the Culbertson
case was a two-edged sword. In the Barrett case, the wife had con-
tributed a relatively large amount of capital to the business but ren-
dered no services and knew nothing of the business affairs. The
court cited Culbertson to the effect that "isolation of original capital"
was an error of emphasis, and disregarded contribution of capital as
an absolute criterion, and considered the other facts of the case,
especially the degree of the wife's control over the proceeds of her
share of the earnings and her lack of voice in the management of the
business. It found, in this case, no intent to create a "real" partner-
ship. In the Funai case, the wife contributed obviously substantial
services. However, when questioned on the stand, she stated, in
effect, that she did not realize that she was a partner. The court
15. The Supreme Court cited here the classic statement that "the state of a
iman's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion". Edgington v.
Fitzmaurice, L. R. Ch. Div. (Eng.) 459.
16. W. F. Harmon, 13 T. C. (No. 53) (1949).
17. Estate of Frederick Depue, 13 T. C. (No. 62) (1949).
18. W. Stanley Barrett, 13 T. C. (No. 71) (1949) ; Funai, 13 T. C. (No. 90)
(1949).
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found no "actual control of income and purposes for which it is
used", and that she rendered no services to the business except that
of performing her duty as a helpful wife to advance the family wel-
fare.
About a month later, the court found little difficulty in finding
the requisite intent in a situation where the husband made a gift of
certain securities to his wife with the avowed purpose of training
her in their management. The wife subsequently used the securities
to purchase a limited partnership interest in a firm in which her
husband was a general partner. The court looked primarily to the
husband's divesting himself of the control of the securities and to
the wife's corresponding assumption of control over the gift and the
proceeds of her partnership interest.19
The District Court for the Nothern District of Alabama had be-
fore it a fact situation which was not a "real" partnership under
even the most lenient pronouncements of the courts.2 0 In that case,
the husband gave his wife and children an outright share in his
lumber business for the purpose of avoiding estate taxes. Neither
the wife nor children performed any services. The husband and
father retained control of the business. However, the court cited
the Culbertson case to the effect "that a heavy burden is placed upon
the taxpayer to show the bona fide intent of the parties" and applies
those familiar criteria: "However, where, as here neither of the three-
usual tests, original capital, management and control, or other vital
services ... are present and the taxpayer has to stand on the single
weak leg of gift capital .. .". Needless to say the partnership was not
recognized.
Although the result of the above case seems to be proper, it is
adhering to the old chestnuts, rejected as absolute criteria by Culbert-
son. Another District Court, this time in Texas, had before it the
fact situation, essentially, of a gift to taxpayer's minor children sub-
sequently invested in a partnership. They performed no services.
The court admitted that the facts caused it to hesitate a bit but
stated, "As I understand the present holdings of the appellate courts,
the good faith intention of the parties to form a partnership must
be sought for, and, if found, it must prevail, if there is substantial
assistance".
2 1
In Huff v. Glenn22 another District Court looked to "the conduct
19. John A. Morris, 13 T. C. (No. 127) (1949).
20. Grayson v. Deal, 85 F. Supp. 431 (1949).
21. Green v. Arnold, 87 F. Supp. 255 (1949).
22. 85 F. Supp. 386 (1949).
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of the parties, their respective abilities, and capital contributions"
which showed good faith and that they acted for a business purpose,
and that the wife contributed substantial services.
The various Circuit Courts of Appeal have been apparently more
successful in adhering to the principles of Culbertson than the Tax
Court or the District Courts.
An illustration of this is the Ginsburg case.2 3  The lower court
having found as a fact that the only services were rendered by the
father, the ourt stated,
".... the capital used in creation of the business income to de-
termine whether it furnishes the taxpayer with a valid reason to
avoid taxation on that portion of the business income assigned
to the children. While the capital interest furnished the children
was originally received by them as a gift from the taxpayers,
this, in and of itself, does not nullify the partnership for tax
purposes. The partnership will be disregarded, however, if the
capital change is a mere surface movement while dominion and
control remain with the donor."
The court found that the distribution to the children was not a suf-
ficient foundation upon which to rest a favorable decision.
The Greenberger case24 stated that in Tower, Lusthaus, and Cul-
bertson could be found "isolated statements . . . which, when con-
sidered alone, appear to afford support to both sides . . . What the
court said in those cases must be considered in connection with the
particular facts of this case". The court thus summarizes the diffi-
culty encountered by the courts when, even in the view of Culbertson
they persist in removing isolated "tests" from Tower, Lusthaus and
Culbertson and applying them as rigid criteria, etc. They persist in
their failure to use these facts as mere elements which go to form the
composite picture of a "real" partnership and not as being the sole
indications of the presence of "reality". The situation has become
confused, not from lack of explicit authority, for Culbertson is our
guide, but from the Court's attempts to justify these conclusions
by application of objective principles. The remedy is not in amended
Regulations nor another Court pronouncement, but rather a recog-
nition and realization of the Supreme Court's expression in Culbertson
directing the courts to search for the "true intent" of the parties
gathered from "all the facts" and not by use of objective criteria.
JOHN ECK, JR.
23. Ginsburg v. Arnold, 176 F. 2d 879 (1949).
24. Greenberger v. Commissioner, 177 F. 2d 990 (1949).
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STATUTORY CON.LIICTS RELATING TO INCEST AND CONSANGUINEOUS
MARRIAGES
Marriages i;ithin the closer degrees of relationship have been
severely condemned and prohibited from early Biblical times. The
peoples of the world have condemned such marriages not only be-
cause marriages of this type are shocking to one's sense of decency, but
also because family intermarriage undermines the parental and filial re-
lationship and tends to corrupt the sentiments of mankind. Scien-
tifically, incestuous marriages are to be censured, for experience
has shown that such marriages very often result in a deficient and
degenerate offspring, which, if occurring to any great extent, would
amount to serious deterioration of the race.' The prohibition of in-
cest and incestuous marriages is found in the Book of Leviticts,
where it is said, "None of you shall approach to any that is near
of kin to uncover their nakedness". The prohibited degrees further
set forth therein, known as the Levitical Degrees, form the basis
of modem statutory prohibitions of incest and incestuous marriages.
2
The law of incest and consanguineous marriages, in the English
speaking world, was first recognized by the ecclesiastical courts of
England. Because of the sacramental character of matrimony, juris-
diction thereof was vested solely within the ecclesiastical courts, the
theory being that the common law judges had no knowledge of divine
law. Within the ecclesiastical courts, incestuous marriages were
only voidable, for the purpose of such courts, "being to vindicate the
divine law rather than to assert property rights, the jurisdiction was
merely to determine the validity of the marriage on direct application
therefor, as a result of which impediments for which the ecclesias-
tical courts would avoid a marriage were called canonical impedi-
ments (such as consanguinity, affinity, corporal infirmities, etc.),
and such marriages were voidable only in a direct proceding main-
tained during the lives of the parties. This necessarily followed
from the fact that, as the ecclesiastical courts had sole jurisdiction
to avoid the marriage, it was not void until so declared, and in the
absence of such declaration must be regarded as valid for all civil
purposes in all tribunals, either legal or equitable, because such courts
could not question it".3 Thus it can be seen, that because consan-
guinity was a canonical impediment to marriage recognized solely by
1. 35 Am. Jur., Marriage, §140.
2. LvTIcus, 18:6-18.
3. L. R. A. 1916C, p. 723.
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the ecclesiastical courts, a consanguineous marriage, in early Eng-
lish law, was therefore only voidable.
4
Incest was also within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. "Though pun-
ishable by ecclesiastical courts of England as an offense against
good morals, incest was not indictable at common law."
5
In the United States today, all jurisdictions have enacted legisla-
tion making incest a crime.6 In South Carolina, the statutory crime
of incest can be found in section 1440 of the S. C. CODE ov LAWS
(1942). This section provides that any person who shall have car-
nal intercourse with persons related within the prohibited statutory
degrees (stated in this section) "shall be deemed guilty of incest,
and shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars,
or imprisonment not less than one year in the penitentiary, or both
such fine and imprisonment".
It can also be said that all jurisdictions of the United States now
have statutes on the subject of marriages prohibited because of con-
sanguinity. 7 Although all states have such statutes, the statutes are
not in accord as to whether such marriages are void ab initio or void-
able. In many jurisdictions such as New Hampshire, consanguineous
marriages are expressly declared void by statute.8 On the other hand,
the state of Virginia by statutory enactment declares that, "All mar-
riages which are prohibited by law on account of consanguinity or
affinity between the parties . . . shall, if solemnized in this State, be
void from the time they shall be so declared by a decree of divorce or
nullity.. ." Many states neither expressly declare such marriages to
be voidable nor absolutely void. In such jurisdictions, it is necessary
to revert to judicial opinion to determine whether incestuous mar-
riages are void or voidable.
South Carolina is among such states. In South Carolina, statutory
prohibition of marriages within the Levitical Degrees is found in
section 8556 of the S. C. CODm or LAWS (1942). Section 8556 pro-
vides that:
"No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, daughter,
granddaughter, stepmother, sister, grandfather's wife, son's wife,
grandson's wife, wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's
4. By the statute 5 and 6 Williams, ch. 54, passed in 1835, consanguineous
marriages are now void in England. State v. Scion Barefoot, 2 Rich. L. 209
(1845).
5. State v. Sauls, 190 N. C. 810, 130 S. E. 848 (1925).
6. 27 Am. Jur., Incest, §1.
7. VZnR, Am RicAx FAMILY LAW, Vol. 1, §38, p. 173.
8. N. H. REV. LAWS, C. 359, §1 (1942).
9. VA. CONE, c. 204, §5088 (1942).
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daughter, wife's granddaughter, brother's daughter, sister's
daughter, father's sister or mother's sister.
"No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grand-
son, stepfather, brother, grandmother's husband, daughter's hus-
band, granddaughter's husband, husband's father, husband's
grandfather, husband's son, husband's grandson, brother's son,
sister's son, father's brother or mother's brother."
As can be seen, this statute does not expressly declare such marriages
to be either voidable or void ab initio. What is the judicial interpre-
tation of this section? The first case decided on this subject was
State v. Barefoot,10 an 1845 decision. In that decision the court
ruled that "the impediment of consanguinity renders the marriage
voidable, not void". The court in discussing the advisability of de-
claring such marriages absolutely void spoke in the following man-
ner: "Reflect for a moment upon such consequences, of this court
undertaking to set aside such marriages as null and void. The father
would lose all right to his offspring, which in law can be no other
than the children of his wife and the children would equally lose
their father, and become bastards. Have not the unborn children,
and the public too, their rights in every marriage? Children are
plainly a third party to marriage, and demand its permanancy". In
State v. Smith,1 1 the court, quoting from Bishop, Marriage and Di-
vorce, points out that consanguineous marriages were voidable in
England. The court then states that "as every enactment is to be
interpreted in harmony with the written law, and as superseding it
only to the extent required by its express terms or necessary opera-
tion, it results that, unless the one defining the forbidden degrees
declares the marriage prohibited void, it is but voidable".
It is the opinion of the writer that the South Carolina Courts have
followed the old English law on the subject. As pointed out, inces-
tuous marriages were voidable in England because consanguinity
was a canonical impediment. However, as time passed and ecclesias-
tical courts disappeared from English jurisprudence, the reason for
declaring consanguineous marriages voidable also disappeared. The
rule, however, remains and the courts have bent to the task of es-
tablishing a new basis for the rule. Such a situation is analogous
to that presented by Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who
states that, "A very common phenemenon, and one very familiar to
the student of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of
10. 2 Rich. L. 209 (1845).
11. 101 S. C. 293, 85 S. E. 958 (1915).
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primitive time established a rule or formula. In the course of cen-
turies the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.
The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and in-
genious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for.
Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and
to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule
adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and
enters a new career".12 Thus, the South Carolina Courts have
followed the early English law. But, finding that the reason for
such law had disappeared, the courts determined upon a new basis;
a basis which was not, at least, the determining reason for the rule
that consanguineous marriages are voidable and not void ab initio.
The new basis which was determined upon by the court was and is
the dictate of public policy which demands the protection of the off-
spring of such marriages.
What is the effect of the South Carolina decisions declaring mar-
riages within the prohibited degrees voidable? Section 1440 de-
clares that carnal intercourse with a party related within the pro-
hibited degrees to be a crime punishable by imprisonment or fine.
Section 8556, by judicial interpretation, is construed to mean that
a consanguineous marriage is only voidable and thus valid in law
until set aside. The effect is a great inconsistency in South Caro-
lina law -a valid marriage, legal for all intents and purposes, where-
in the parties are subject to fine or imprisonment for the crime of
incest.
Is there a solution to this conflict? The question resolves itself
to determining a reconciliation of two conflicting public policies, each
equally strong. On the one hand there is that policy which declares
that incestuous marriages are shocking to one's sense of decency and
demands that such marriages be prohibited. This policy has culmin-
ated in the enacting of the incest statute. On the other hand, there
is the public belief which steadfastly maintains that no child should
suffer the ostracism of bastardy. Thus, incestuous marriages are
voidable. Can these conflicting policies be reconciled into a harmoni-
ous law? What was the intention of the legislature and how can
that intention be realized?
In ascertaining legislative intent in relation to the two conflicting
sections, it is permissible to utilize the rule of constructon that
statutes in par mnateria must be construed with reference to each
other. "The rule which thus allows the court to resort to statutes
12. HOLuMS, THE COMMON LAw, p. 5.
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in pari materia finds its justification in the assumption that statutes
relating to the same subject matter were enacted in accord with the
legislative policy, that together they constitute a harmonious or uni-
form system of law; and that, therefore, in order to maintain this
harmony, every statute treating of the same subject matter should
be considered. As a result, statutes in pari materia should not only
be considered but also construed to be in harmony with each other in
order that each may be fully effective. They are to be construed
together as if they constituted one act". 13 It is certain that sections
1440 and 8556 relate to the same subject and stem from a common
source, the Levitical Degrees. They should therefore be construed
together. Section 1440 expressly makes incest a crime. Section 8556
does not declare incestuous marriages to be either void or voidable.
Thus, there is an ambiguity which can be made clear by construing
the ambiguous section, 8556, with section 1440. It would seem
therefore, that consanguineous marriages, in view of section 1440,
should be absolutely void.
This result was reached by the Supreme Court of Alabama. The
Alabama Code relating to incestuous marriages simply declares, after
setting forth the prohibited degrees, that "all such marriages are
incestuous". 14 Alabama has also a criminal statute declaring that if
any one has sexual intercourse, or commits adultery, with a relation
within the prohibited degrees, "each of them shall, on conviction, be
imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than
seven years". 15 The Alabama Supreme Court in construing these
sections declared that "It cannot be argued, with any degree of plausi-
bility, that marriages between persons within the prohibited degrees
of relationship are not by the incest statute of Alabama declared to
be incestuous and void. The two sections of the Code stand in pari
materia, and must be construed together. So construed, we must
and do hold that marriages prohibited by sections ... are absolutely
void, void ab initio".1 6 (The fact that section 1440 was not en-
acted until 1884 may have had a great deal to do with the existing
law as to consanguineous marriages in South Carolina. For the first
case declaring incestuous marriages to be voidable, which case estab-
lished a precedent in South Carolina, was handed down in 1845, thirty-
nine years before the enactment of the incest statute, section 1440.)
Thus the legislative intent may be said to declare incestuous mar-
13. CRAWFORD, THn CONsTRuc~roN oF STATUTES, §231, pp. 433-444.
14. ALA. CODE, tit. 34, §1 (1940).
15. ALA. CoDe, tit. 14, §325 (1940).
16. Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938).
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riages void. By so construing section 8556, the public policy which
condemns such marriages is satisfied. But what of that policy which
demands the protection of the offspring? To declare the marriage
void is to subject such children to the shame of a position of illegiti-
macy. Is there some way in which consanguineous marriages may be
declared void and yet satisfy the public demand for the protection
of the children of void marriages?
The answer to this dilemma can be found by an appraisal of legis-
lation of other jurisdictions. In the State of New York, there are
statutes declaring marriages of persons within the prohibited degree
void 17 and penal statutes making incest a criminal offense.' 8 How-
ever, New York has satisfied the public dictate which demands the
protection of the progeny of void marriages by the following statu-
tory provision: "If a marriage is declared to be a nullity as incestu-
ous, a child of the marriage is deemed the ligitimate child of both
parents". 19 A similar statute exists in Arkansas which provides that
"The issue of all marriages deemed null in law, or dissolved by di-
vorce, shall be deemed and considered as legitimate".2 0 There are
similar statutes in other jurisdictions.
It has been the aim of the writer to point out the inconsistency
in the law of South Carolina existing between section 1440, the in-
cest statute, and section 8556, which prohibits marriages within the
statutory degrees. It can be seen that there is need for legislative
action to make for uniformity in the law of South Carolina. Such
uniformity can be accomplished through an amendment to section
8556 whereby consanguineous marriages will be declared void ab
initio. It is believed that this was the intention of the Legislature,
in view of the incest statute and the doctrine of pari nateria. The
Legislature should not only be urged to amend section 8556 by mak-
ing incestuous marriages void ab initio, but also in order to complete-
ly satisfy the dictates of public policy, the General Assembly should
take steps to make the issue of such marriages legitimate, as did
New York and Arkansas. In this way, the conflict in the South
Carolina law relating to the Levitical Degrees can be reconciled and
the demands of public policy satisfied.
BENijAMIN GOLDBERG.
17. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law, art. 2, Marriages,
§2 (McKinney's).
18. N. Y. CoNsor,. LAWS, Book 39, Part 1, Penal Law, art. 102, Incest. §1.
19. N. Y. LAws, Part III, Civil Practice Act, §1135, sub. 5 (1939) ; Smith v.
Smith, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 137, 179 Misc. 19 (1942).
20. ARK. STAr., tit. 55, §55-103.
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